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Comment
UNLIQUIDATED TORT CLAIMS IN PROBATE
PROCEEDINGS-NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Probating the estate of a person who has died in a traffic
accident raises the question of whether to give other persons in-
volved in the accident notice of the probate proceedings when it
appears that the decedent may have been at fault. One practice
is to file the estate for probate quickly, giving notice only by
publication and hoping that the potential claimants fail to .ile by
claim day, generally about six months later.1 Then not only are
their claims forever barred, but their counterclaims may be
barred in a wrongful death suit brought by the executor. Ne-
braska and other states have supported this practice in the past
by holding that a tort claimant who is given only notice by pub-
lication of the pendency of the probate proceedings is forever
precluded from presenting his claim if it was not filed in time.2
When the names and addresses of persons who were injured
or .who suffered damage in the accident are listed in the police
accident report, or are otherwise easily ascertainable, it seems
unjust to bar their claims after only six months without at least
notice by mail of the probate proceedings. Indeed, examination
of current cases in the United States Supreme Court produces
the almost inescapable conclusion that known potential claimants
are entitled by due process of law to notice by mail. Although
no state court has as yet discussed the due process question in
detail, several courts have recently allowed the holders of un-
liquidated tort claims to sue for recovery, at least against the
decedent's insurance, even when the claim was barred by the
nonclaim statute.3
1 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-603 (Reissue 1964) allows the county court to set
the time for allowance of claims between three and eighteen months
after the granting of letters testamentary or of administration.
2 Hayes v. Thomas, 161 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Donnella v.
Crady, 185 N.E.2d 623 (Ind. App. Ct. 1962), appeal denied, 191 N.E.2d
499 (Ind. 1963); Farmers Co-op. Mercantile Co. v. Sidner, 175 Neb. 94,
120 N.W.2d 537 (1963);' Storm v. Cluck, 168 Neb. 13, 95 N.W.2d 161(1959); State ex rel. Patchett v. Superior Court, 60 Wash. 2d 784, 375
P.2d 747 (1962).
3 Smith v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 30 F.R.D. 540 (M.D. Tenn.
1962); Gwaltney v. Scott, 195 A.2d 247 (Del. 1963), overruling Brock-
son v. Richardson Bros., 41 Del. (2 Terry) 465, 24 A.2d 537 (Super.
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The purpose of this comment is to explore the law- in this
area in depth. The main issues to be treated are:
(1) The underlying public policies;
(2) The current Nebraska case law and statutory require-
ments, especially section 25-520.01, the legislative intent behind
this section, and its relationship to the due process clause;
(3) The limitations placed by the due process clause upon the
use of notice by publication as a means for notifying persons of
proceedings which may affect their rights in general;
(4) The character of unliquidated tort claims as "property"
within the meaning of the due process clause;
(5) The kind of notice required to be. given to the holders
of unliquidated tort claims when their claims are (a) known,
(b) not known, but discoverable, or (c) not reasonably discover-
able;
(6) The possibility of reaching the decedent's insurance
whether or not claims against the estate itself are barred.
.I. PUBLIC POLICY
It has been argued that a person injured in an accident
Where the culpable party is killed is on notice of the fact that
his claim will soofibe cut off by a*probate proceeding. 4  But
this rests on the harsh legal fidtion that the potential claimant
knows the law. In fact he may still be unrepresented by counsel,
perhaps even still in the hospital, and with no idea that probate
proceedings are under way which vill soon substantially nullify
any chance of recovery he may have from the culpable party.
This legal trap is not just a supposed danger. Many cases have
litigated the problem, and surely many others have arisen which
have not been contested in states where there is already adverse
precedent.
Nebraska encourages speedy prosecution of law suits and looks
with disfavor upon bringing old claims. Pursuant to this policy
there is a four year statute of limitations onf negligence actions. 5
However, the effect of present probate law is to modify the
Ct. 1942); Groves v. Donohue, 254 Iowa 412,. 118 N.W.2d 65 (1962);
Railsback v. Buesch, 253 Iowa 1064, 114 N.W.2d 916 (1962); Gottsch
v. Ireland, 358 P.2d 1097 (Okla. 1961); Collins v. Ruffner, 185 Tenn.
290, 206 S.W.2d 298 ,(1947).
4 Storm v. Cluck, 168 Neb. 13, 19, 95 N.W.2d 161, 166 (1959).
5 NFB. REV. STAT. § 25-207 (Reissue 1964).
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statute by reducing the time from four years to six months. Our
sense of justice is offended by the idea that the general statute
of limitations on negligence actions should be only six months.
Furthermore, the reasoning that the potential claimant should
be on notice was largely discredited by the United States Supreme
Court in a bankruptcy case, where the Court said:
The argument is that . . . knowledge [of the bankruptcy and sub-
sequent reorganization] puts a duty on creditors to inquire for
themselves about possible court orders limiting the" time for filing
claims. But even creditors who have- knowledge of a reorganiza-
tion have a right to assume that the statutory 'reasonable notice'
will be given them before their claims are forever barred.6
Due to the fortuity of death, a nonculpable party may be
uncompensated for his injury, and the heirs of the one at fault
may receive a windfall because the deceased's estate has escaped
an obligation to pay for his wrongful act. Moreover, an insur-
ance company which has contracted to be responsible for the neg-
ligence of the decedent may escape liability through the acci-
dental circumstance that its insured was killed.
There are, of course, policy considerations on the other side.
Estates should be probated quickly, and once the assets are
distributed it is desirable to insure that the estate will not have to
be reopened. But the estate will almost always be represented by
attorneys who know the law. There is no reason that persons
who are reasonably known to have potential claims arising out
of an accident with the decedent, and, whose names and addresses
are easily ascertainable, should not be given notice by mail of the
probate proceedings. The attorney for. an estate could scarcely
defend on grounds that he did not know the decedent died in an
auto accident, since in the normal case he would be compelled
to investigate the possibility of bringing an action for wrongful
death, pain and suffering, and property damages.
This is not to say that an estate's attorneys would be bound
to discover all claims which might arise out of an accident. But
they should certainly be aware that all persons mentioned in the
police accident report might have claims. Similarly, they should
be required to notify at least the spouse, parents, or children of
any other person listed by the report as killed in the accident, if
the names and addresses of such persons are easily ascertainable.
On the other hand, no one would contend that they should be
6 City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293, 297 (1953).
(Emphasis added.), Notice by publication was held insufficient. Credi-
tors were at least entitled to notice by mail.
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bound to give notice to a spectator on the theory that he might
have suffered injury as a result of shock, or to the state on the
possibility that the highway may have been damaged. Nor should
the estate be required to give notice to anyone when it appears
reasonably certain that the deceased was not at fault and would
not incur any liability as a result of the accident.
7
II. NEBRASKA LAW
The first case to consider this question in Nebraska was
Storm v. Cluck.8 Although it was decided in 1959, it dealt with
an order barring claims which had been rendered in 1954. At that
time the Nebraska Revised Statutes required only notice by publi-
cation of the final date for presentation of claims.9 It was not un-
til three years later, in 1957, that Nebraska's statutes were exten-
sively amended by section 25-520.01 and related sections,10 to
require notice by mail in many cases where it had not been
previously necessary. Unless we assume that these amendments
are without effect, Storm and other cases considering pre-1957
orders are no longer good precedent.
The leading case on the interpretation of section 25-520.01 in
7 It has also been argued that due process does not require the mailing
of notice to persons whose claims are about to be barred by the stat-
ute of limitations, and therefore, it should not require the mailing of
notice to persons whose claims are about to be barred by the nonclaim
statute. See Storm v. Cluck, 168 Neb. 13, 21-22, 95 N.W.2d 161, 167
(1959). But here the estate is attempting to exercise a statutory priv-
ilege to terminate decedent's liability for a tortious action. To take
advantage of that privilege a duty is imposed upon it to exercise due
diligence to insure that innocent parties are not prejudiced thereby.
The determinative factor is that this is a judicial proceeding, and
United States Supreme Court cases to be discussed later have made it
clear that due process does require notice of judicial proceedings
which operate to bar claims. The same argument could be used to say
that creditors who held disputed claims were not entitled to notice,
but they clearly are under City of New York v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953). Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S.
208 (1962) appears to extend this doctrine to potential tort claimants.
Query: Would giving notice to potential tort claimants violate
Canon 28 of the American Bar Association Canons of Professional
Ethics, which forbids stirring up litigation? It would seem the same
reasoning would apply. Certainly no A.B.A. opinion on Canon 28 sup-
ports this view.
8 168 Neb. 13, 95 N.W.2d 161 (1959).
9 Id. at 19, 95 N.W.2d at 166. The statute in question still exists, NEB.
Rav. STAT. § 30-601 (Reissue 1964), but it has been modified by other
sections as noted below.
10 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-520.01 to -.04 (Reissue 1964).
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probate proceedings is Farmers Co-op. Mercantile Co. v. Sidner.11
In that case, an order was issued barring all claims not filed
against an estate by a certain date.12 Several months after the
deadline, the plaintiff, alleging the decedent's negligence, insti-
tuted a suit against the administrator to recover for damages sus-
tained in the same motor vehicle collision which had resulted in
the decedent's death. Notice of the order had been published as
required by statute, but the estate had not sent notice by. mail to
any party. The plaintiff contended he was entitled to notice by
mail under section 25-520.01 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes13 and
under the due process clauses of the state and federal constitu-
tions. 14 Section 25-520.01, essentially a codification of the require-
ments of due process, requires that in any proceeding where notice
by publication is authorized by law, the party instituting the pro-
ceeding shall mail a copy of the published notice to every party
known to have a "direct legal interest" in the proceeding, if his
name and address are known. In the absence of such notice, the
proceeding will not bar the rights of any party who should have
been so notified. Plaintiff contended that his unliquidated tort
claim against the estate for the decedent's negligence was a
"direct legal interest" within the meaning of the statute.
11 175 Neb. 94, 120 N.W.2d 537 (1963).
12 The county court is empowered to fix such deadlines by NEB. REV.
STAT. § 30-603 (Reissue 1964). Under NEs. REv. STAT. § 30-605 (Re-
issue 1964), a creditor may apply for an extension of time, but must
do so within three months of the date set. Notice by publication of
the date set is required by NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-601 (Reissue 1964).
13 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-520.01 (Reissue 1964): "In any action or pro-
ceeding of any kind or nature, as defined in section 25-520.02 [which
includes 'all . . . proceedings in any court'], where a notice by pub-
lication is given as authorized by law, a party instituting or main-
taining the action or proceeding with respect to notice or his attorney
shall within five days after the first publication of notice send by
United States mail a copy of such published notice to each and every
party appearing to have a direct legal interest in such action or pro-
ceeding whose name and post-office address are known to him. Proof
by affidavit of the mailing of such notice shall be made by the party
or his attorney and shall be filed with the officer with whom filings
are required to be made in such action or proceeding within ten days
after mailing of such notice. Such affidavit of mailing of notice shall
further be required to state that such party and his attorney, after
diligent investigation and inquiry, were-unable to ascertain and do nbt
know the post-office address of any other party appearing to have a
direct legal interest in such action or proceeding other than those to
whom notice has been mailed in writing."
14 The due process issue was argued with extreme brevity in both briefs,
and was not treated by the court. Brief for Appellant, pp. 35-36,
Brief for Appellee, pp. 17-18.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court held that plaintiff's claim was
barred, since his petition failed to allege that any party required
to give him notice by mail of the order barring claims had knowl-
edge of his claim. The court said:
In refutation of the contention that the claim which is the
basis of the application amounted to a direct legal interest in the
probate action or proceeding, it must be said that the petition
contains no pleading of fact the effect of which was to say that
this was apparent to any party required to give and mail notice
or to make affidavit.'5
Although the Sidner decision is correct because of the plain-
tiff's failure to allege knowledge of the claim on the part of the
estate, the case implies that notice by mail of an order barring
claims would not have to be given the holder of an unliquidated
tort claim under section 25-520.01, even if it were pleaded and
proved that the estate or its attorney knew of the intention to
file a claim against the decedent and knew the claimant's name
and address. Section 25-520.01 was said not to apply to interests
such as the plaintiff's, because "there could be no direct legal
interest in the estate in the absence of fixation of damage.' u6
The legislative intent un'derlying section 25-520.01 was to
codify the requirements of federal due process of law with re-
spect to notice by publication, and. this section must be construed
to require notice by mail in at least all cases where federal
due process requires such notice, if Nebraska's statutes are to
conform to federal constitutional standards. Section 25-520.01 was
originally recommended by the Nebraska State Bar Association
because "the decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Mullane17 and City of Hutchinson' cases and re-
lated cases made it imperative that our statutes on the subject
[of notice by publication] be reexamined."' 9 Similarly, the state-
ment of the Judiciary Committee of the Nebraska Legislature said
"the United States Supreme Court has thrown into uncertainty
the validity of notice by publication," and this bill attempts "to
make an immediate correction of our notice requirements. '20
15 175 Neb. at 100, 120 N.W.2d at 541.
16 Ibid.
17 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1960).
(Footnote added.)
18 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956). (Footnote added.)
19 Proceedings of the Nebraska State Bar Association, 37 NEB. L. Rav. 1,
105 (1957). (Footnotes not in the original).
20 Statement on L.B. 589, Neb. Leg. J., 68th Sess. 825 (1957).
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The statute, as written, employs the vague term "direct legal
interest," a phrase which has no established legal meaning. In-
deed, it is unique to the state of Nebraska; and here it has been
used in only one other statute, which is of little or no help in
analyzing its definition in the present context.21  The vague
character of section 25-520.01, however, is not to be criticized.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the
impossibility of formulating any rigid rules to be applied mechani-
cally in every situation to determine what constitutes adequate
notice.22  The Nebraska statute, as it stands, is flexible enough
to conform to the requirements of due process as the United
States Supreme Court clarifies them.2 3
21 NEB. R V. STAT. § 25-1202 (Reissue 1964), the 'Dead Man's Statute,"
which provides: "No person having a direct legal interest in the re-
sult of any civil action or proceeding, when the adverse party is the
representative of a deceased person, shall be permitted to testify to
any transaction or conversation had between the deceased person and
the witness .... " These two statutes were enacted for widely diver-
gent purposes. Section 25-520.01 was enacted to insure that property
would not be taken without due process of law. The Dead Man's
Statute is an evidehtiary statute 'dealing with the *competency of wit-
nesses. The brief of the plaintiff in Sidner argued that, :because the
term was so unique,- it should be construed similarly in both statutes.
The court did not choose to look at § 25rl202 to interpret. § 25-520.01,
however, merely noting that "direct legal interest" had never been
construed in the context of § 25-520.01. Clearly, if § 25-520.01 is to
accomplish iti" intiended" and'necessary result, it* is important that it
be construed in light of the due process clause, rather than in accord
with the Dead Man's Statute.
22 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950):
"The Court has not committed itself to any formula ... determining
when constructive -notice may be utilized .... ." Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S.. 112, 115 (1956): "We [have] ... called atten-
tion to the impossibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the kind
of notice that must be given; notice required will vary with circum-
stances and conditions." 'Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208,
212 (1962): "[Pjractical considerations ... make it impossible to
draw a standard set of specifications as to what is constitutionally
adequate notice, to be mechanically applied in every situation."
23 For a discussion of the handling of the dilemma raised in Mullane in
other states, see Comment, 49 IowA L. REV. 185 (1963). This article
was written to comment on Jones v. Village of Farnam, 174 Neb. 704,
119 N.W.2d 157 (1963), another case construing § 25-520.01. For other
discussions of this problem ifi Nebraska, see Grether & Gradwohl,
Property Management and Estate Planning for Nebraska Minors, 42
NEB. L. REv. 1, 31 & n.163 (1962) (discussed very briefly); Mattoon,
Ronin & Troyer, Selected Probate Questions, 39 NEB. L. REv. 349, 357
(1960); Troyer, Problems in Probate and Administration Procedure,
37 NEB. L. REv. 134 (1957); Note, 32 NEB. L. REv. 432 (1953) (casenote
on Mullane).
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It is important to note that section 25-520.01 must require
notice by mail in at least all situations in which federal due
process requires notice by mail, if Nebraska's provisions for
notice by publication are to meet due process requirements. Due
process of law requires that notice by mail, rather than notice
by publication, be given to known parties whose property inter-
ests will be affected by judicial proceedings. Section 25-520.01
requires that, where notice by publication was formerly sufficient,
notice by mail must now be given to known parties whose "direct
legal interests" will be affected. Since this section is the only
Nebraska statute which modifies the original notice by publication
statutes to provide for notice by mail, the interest which must be
protected is in reality not so much "direct legal interest" as
"property interest." For example, if the Nebraska Supreme Court
were to say that notice by publication was sufficient under Ne-
braska statutes to inform a given party that his rights were before
the courts, but federal due process guaranteed to that party more
than notice by publication, e.g., notice by mail, then that party's
right to notice by mail would be preserved by the United States
Constitution notwithstanding the provisions of the state statute.
Hence, the Nebraska statute allowing notice by publication would
be unconstitutional. Clearly, then, to understand when notice by
mail will be required, it is imperative that the requirements of
due process of law be examined.
III. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
Before a person can be deprived of a known property right
by any judicial proceeding, he must be given notice of the pro-
ceeding at least by mail, if his name and address are known.24
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that notice by publication "is incompatible
with the requirements of the fourteenth amendment as a basis
for adjudication depriving known persons whose whereabouts are
also known of substantial property rights. '25  The Court said,
"Where the names and postoffice addresses of those affected by a
proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to means
24 The constitutionality of notice by publication was first seriously ques-
tioned in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917), where Mr.
Justice Holmes said: "But it appears to us that an advertisement in
a local newspaper is not sufficient notice to bind a person who has
left a State intending not to return. To dispense with personal serv-
ice the substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant is the
least that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done."
25 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950).
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less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency."26
The property right involved in Mullane was the interest of
a beneficiary of one of 113 trusts pooled in a common trust fund.
City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.27 extended the
Mullane doctrine to cover creditors. The United States Supreme
Court held that notice by publication of an order barring claims
against a bankrupt after a certain date was insufficient to meet
the requirements of due process of law with regard to a known
creditor. A known creditor is entitled to at least notice by
mail; therefore, its claim was not barred.
Schroeder v. City of New York,28 decided in 1962, is an ex-
tension of the Mullane doctrine to protect the holder of an un-
liquidated claim for damage caused by an instrumentality of the
state. The City of New York had diverted part of the Neversink
River, and the plaintiff alleged "damages based upon the impair-
ment of the river's value... for 'bathing, swimming, fishing and
boating.' This claimed impairment allegedly resulted not from
any change in the river's course, depth, or configuration, but from
a decrease in the velocity of its flow." 29 An act had been passed
requiring that all claims for damage resulting from the diversion
be filed within three years or be forever barred. The plaintiff
was given notice of this by publication in four newspapers and by
the posting of notices on trees and poles. The Court held such
notice did, not meet the requirements of due process of law,
saying "the city was constitutionally obliged to make at least a
good - faith effort to give [this information] personally to the
appellant-an obligation which the mailing of a single letter
would have discharged.130
The Court has made it clear that the Mullane doctrine ex-
tends its protection to all "legally protected interests." In
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, it said:
That case [Mullane] establishes the rule that, if feasible, notice
must be reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings
.which may directly and adversely affect their IegallV protected
interests.3 1
20 Id. at 318.
27 344 U.S, 293 (1953).
28 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
29 Id. at 214 n.6.
80 Id. at 214.
31 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956). (Emphasis added.)
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In Schroeder, it said:
The general rule that emerges from the Mullane case is that
notice by publication is not enough with respect to a person whose
name and address are known or very easily ascertainable and
whose legally protected interests are directly affected by the pro-
ceedings in question.3 2
As has been pointed out, the basis for all of these decisions is
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. "Legally
protected interests," then, must mean "life, liberty or property"
within the meaning of the due process clause. Similarly, this
must be the meaning of the unique Nebraska phrase "direct legal
interest," at least as it is used in section 25-520.01.
It must be borne in mind that whatever meaning is formu-
lated for the term "direct legal interest," it must be one which
will apply uniformly in all judicial proceedings, since these are
the terms of the statute. The United States Supreme Court has
specifically considered notice problems in judicial accounting,3 3
condemnation,3 4 and bankruptcy 35 proceedings, and in every case
has said that the rules laid down are to be applied generally to all
judicial proceedings. Certainly there is no basis for treating a
probate proceeding differently.
IV. CHARACTER OF AN UNLIQUIDATED TORT CLAIM
An unliquidated tort claim is "property" within the protection
of the fourteenth amendment; therefore, a person may not be
deprived of an unliquidated tort claim without due process of
law. In Sidner, the Nebraska Supreme Court said: "From an
examination of the pronouncements on the subject it appears that
it ought to be said that a claim of unliquidated damages should
be regarded as a claim of ownership of a property right."3 6 It may
seem incongruous that the court recognized an unliquidated tort
claim as a claim of ownership of a property right, but not as a
"direct legal interest" Within the meaning of section 25-520.01,
since the effect of this position is to deny to the holder of such a
claim the due process guarantee of sufficient notice of any judi-
cial proceeding adversely affecting that property right. The tone
32 371 U.S. at 212-13. (Emphasis added.)
33 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
34 Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of
Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S.
141 (1956), discussed in note 59 infra.
85 City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953).
36 175 Neb. 94, 100, 120 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1963).
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of the opinion and a close examination of the reasoning behind
it37 indicate, however, that perhaps, rather than the rule that
there could be no direct legal interest in the absence of fixation
of damage, the court intended to lay down a narrower rule to the
effect that, in the absence of fixation of damage, there could be.
no direct legal interest in the estate which would require notice
under section 25-520.01, unless knowledge of the claim on the
part of the executor were pleaded and proved.
Numerous cases have held that unliquidated tort claims are
property and that they are protected by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. In Martinez v. Fox Valley Bus
Lines, Inc.,5 the plaintiff was injured through the negligence of
the bus line. The company defended on grounds that the plaintiff
was an alien unlawfully in the United States and, therefore,
could not bring an action in tort for damages in the courts of
the United States. The federal district court held that an alien in
the country illegally may not be deprived of his property without
due process of law and that an unliquidated tort claim is prop-
erty protected by the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment's
due process clause. The court said, "One injured as a result of
the negligence of another has a right of action against that other
to recover damages sustained by reason of such injury. That
right of action is property.' 's9
87 The only support or reasoning offered by the court for this proposi-
tion is the following: "7n refutation of the contention that the claim
which is the basis of the application amounted to a direct legal interest
in the probate action or proceeding, it must be said that the petition
contains no pleading of fact the effect of which was to say that this
was apparent to any party required to give and mail notice or to make
affidavit." Id. at 100, 120 N.W.2d at 541.
In other words, the court seems to say that this wis not a direct
legal interest because it was not shown "that this was apparent to any
party required to... mail notice .... " Now, since the statute itself
requires notice by mail only where (1) a "direct legal interest" and(2) knowledge of the interest are present, it follows that the actual
existence of a "direct ligal interest'" (i.e. property interest) cannot
turn upon whether a'third party has knowledge of the interest. As-
suming a "direct legal interest" is substantially a property interest, it
can be seen that the actual existence, of a property interest cannot be
made to turn on whether a given third party has knowledge of the
interest. It would be more accurate to say that plaintiffs claim did
not require notice in accordance with the statute because the second
element-knowledge of the claim-was lacking, or at least,. because
the plaintiff.had failed to allege it was present. While the language
of the court may be technically incorrect, the meaning is clear.
88 17 F. Supp. 576. (N.D. Ill. 1936).
39 Id. at 577. Accord, Janusis v. Long, 284 Mass. 403i 188 N.E. 228 (1933).
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In Rosane v. Senger,40 the plaintiff claimed damages for
negligence against a doctor and others for failing to remove a
gauze pad from his abdomen after an operation. The negligence
was not discovered until after the statute of limitations had run.
The Colorado Supreme Court allowed recovery, basing its deci-
sion in part on the due process clause. The court said, "A legal
right to damage for an injury is property and one can not be
deprived of his property without due process. There can be no
due process unless the party deprived has his day in court .... -41
Gregory v. Colvin42 involved a suit in tort for conversion.
The trial ended twice in a hung jury and the lower court entered
an order permanently denying petitioner's request for trial on
the grounds that, in the court's opinion, any future trial of the
case would again result in a deadlocked jury. The petitioner
contended on appeal that to deny her another trial was to deprive
her of her property without due process of law in contravention
of constitutional guarantees. The appellate court said, "Petition-
er's suit in tort is a 'chose in action. . . . It is basic property law
that a chose in action is personal property."43  Then, the court
went on to say: "'The right to recover actual damage is prop-
erty and the constitutional guarantees of that right are the same
as of other property rights, hence an injured party cannot be de-
prived thereof without due process of law .... ,-
These and other45 cases illustrate the doctrine that an un-
liquidated tort claim of the type involved in Sidner is a property
40 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372 (1944).
. 41 Id. at 370, 149 P.2d at 375. Nebraska followed the rule of the Rosane
case in Spath v. Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962), 42
NFB. L. R.v. 180, but the majority view is that the statute of lim-
itations on malpractice actions-runs even against undiscovered injuries.
See cases collected in Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1317, 1322 (1931); Annot., 144
A.L.R. 209, 227 (1943); Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368, 374 (1961). No case
which has reached a result contrary to Rosane has disagreed with the
Colorado court's statement that such claims are protected by due pro-
cess. 'They merely disagree as to what the requirements of due process
are.
42 235 Ark. 1007, 363 S.W.2d 539 (1963).
43 Id. at. 1008, 363 S.W.2d at 540.
44 Ibid.
45 E.g., Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882): "[A] vested right of
action is property in the same sense in which tangible things are
property, and is equally protected against arbitrary interference.
Whether it springs from contract or from the principles of the common
law, it is not competent for the legislature to take it away." Id. at 132.(Emphasis added.) This language was quoted in Mnich v. American
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right and is protected by due process guarantees. The United
States Supreme Court has held that a known creditor was en-
titled to notice by mail of the order barring claims against a
bankrupt. 0 Assuming that a tort claim is a property right en-
titled to the same protection as a contract claim, it is reasonable
to infer that a known tort claimant would be entitled to notice
by mail of a similar order barring claims against an estate in a
probate proceeding. If the Nebraska Supreme Court does not
interpret section 25-520.01 to require that notice by mail of an
order barring claims be sent to known tort claimants, such
claimants may be deprived of property without due process of
law.
There are, however, a few types of unliquidated tort claims
which some state courts have held are not protected by the due
process clause, even though they are property rights. These
courts contend that the federal constitution does not extend its
protection to property rights which are purely statutory and have
always been deemed subject to state regulation, that is, rights
which have no foundation in the common law.47 But actions
Radiator Co., 263 App. Div. 573, 574-75, 34 N.Y.S.2d 16, 17 (1942), affd
mem., 289 N.Y. 681, 45 N.E.2d 333 (1942), where the workmen's com-
pensation statute barring action in tort for breach of statutory duty to
provide a safe place in which to work was held unconstitutional as
applied to an injury occurring before passage of the statute. Accord,
Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line RR., 153 N.C. 360, 69 S.E. 402 (1910),
where a statute barring action in tort for wrongful ejection from a
train, without allowing reasonable time in which to bring suit, was
held violative of due process where the tortious act took place before
the statute was passed.
46 City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 293 (1953),
discussed in text accompanying note 27 supra.
47 It has been held that a vested right of action may be cut off immedi-
ately without providing the due process requirement of a reasonable
time in which to file suit, when the cause of action is for: (1) aliena-
tion of affection, Pennington v. Stewart, 212 Ind. 533, 10 N.E.2d 619
(1937), and Hanfgarn v. Mark, 274 N.Y. 570, 10 N.E.2d 556 (1937);
(2) breach of contract to marry, Fearon v. Treanor, 273 N.Y. 645, 8
N.E.2d 36 (1937); (3) seduction, Magierowski v. Buckley, 39 N.J.
Super. 534, 121 A.2d 749 (Super. Ct. 1956); (4) wrongful death, cases
cited note 49 infra. See also Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 3 A.2d
839 (1939); Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 153 N.C. 360, 69 S.E.
402 (1910). The United States Supreme Court has held that the pro-
tection of the federal constitution does not extend to dower rights
where the husband is seized of the land, since dower is not a common
law property right in the United States and has always been subject
to regulation by each state. Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 258 U.S.
314 (1922); Randall v. Kreiger, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 137 (1874). The
common law right to sue a negligent employer for injuries arising in
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for damages as a result of negligence do not fall within this
rule because they have a long history in the common law; and it
has been held that a legislature may not deprive a person of his
right to sue for injuries resulting from an automobile accident,
unless it is done in a manner consistent with constitutional guar-
antees.
48
The distinction between purely statutory interests and com-
mon law interests becomes important when considered with rela-
tion to an action for wrongful death. In Nebraska, the action for
wrongful death is a purely statutory right given to the next of kin
and has no basis in the common law.49  On the basis of the
state court decisions which indicate that the protection of the
federal constitution does not extend to purely statutory prop-
erty rights, it could be argued that a state can set up any kind of
notice requirements with regard to probate proceedings barring
the right to sue estates for wrongful death. On the other hand,
the action for pain and suffering of the deceased, which belongs
to his estate, rather than to his next of kin, is a common law
right in Nebraska, and therefore is protected by the due process
requirements regarding sufficiency of notice.50 Thus, according
to the argument that a statutory action for wrongful death is not
the course of employment has been abolished in most states by work-
men's compensation laws. These laws are constitutional when they
do not deny recovery altogether, even though they may allow recovery
of only a statutory amount, and when they give the injured party
some advantage in return, i.e., abolition of the employer's common law
defenses. See cases collected in Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1297 (1933).
48 Birmingham-Tuscaloosa Ry. & Util. Co. v. Carpenter, 194 Ala. 141, 69
So. 626 (1915) (statute imputing driver's contributory negligence. to
passenger held unconstitutional); Coleman v. Rhodes, 35 Del. (5 W.W.
Harr.) 120, 159 Atl. 649 (1932) (guest statute depriving guest of right
to sue operator or owner even for gross negligence held unconstitu-
tional); Stewart v. Houk, 127 Ore. 589, 271 Pac. 998 (1928) (statute
similar to the one in Coleman v. Rhodes, supra, held unconstitutional).
See also Massa v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 3 A.2d 839 (1939).
49 Bennet v. Hargus, 1 Neb. 419 (Neb. Terr. 1859). This case was de-
cided before either the fourteenth amendment or the Nebraska Con-
stitution existed, but territories are bound by the fifth amendment
due process clause. Accord, Hazzard v. Alexander, 36 Del. (6 W.W.
Harr.) 212, 173 Atl. 517 (1934). The rule at common law was actio
personalis moritur cum persona (a personal right of action dies with
the person).
50 In re Estate of Grainger, 121 Neb. 338, 237 N.W. 153 (1931). There
was no action for pain and suffering of the deceased at British com-
mon law. Query: Is the British common law doctrine that a right
of action died with the defendant a part of the common law of Ne-
braska?
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a right protected by the Constitution, if A's estate had knowledge
(1) that B's estate intended to file a common law claim against
it for pain and suffering of B before his death and (2) that cer-
tain of B's next of kin intended to file a statutory wrongful
death action, federal due process would require notice by mail of
the order barring claims to be sent to B's estate but not to B's
next of kin, even though the particular claimants were known.
Such an incongruous result is unlikely, however. Assuming that
state due process must include at least as much as federal due
process, it would put a very strained construction on the state due
process clause to say it extended its protection to one of these
claims, but not the other. Similarly, it is unlikely that the Ne-
braska Supreme Court would say one was a "direct legal inter-
est" within the meaning of section 25-520.01, while the other was
not. But whatever question there may be about its application
to wrongful death actions, it is clear that the federal due process
clause extends its protection to other unliquidated claims for
damages arising out of automobile accidents.
It is true that the United States Supreme Court has said, on
the peculiar facts of Mullane, that notice by mail would not have
to be given to holders of conjectural or contingent interests.
There are two substantial reasons, however, why this language
may not be taken as saying, in general, that notice would not
have to be given to the holder of an unliquidated tort claim.
First, an unliquidated tort claim of the type involved in
Sidner does not fall within the classification of either "conjec-
tural" or "contingent" interests. A claim which is a matter of
conjecture is founded on evidence too remote to cause belief or
on a "'probability without any demonstration of its truth.' ,;'
If there is "evidence which points to any one theory of causa-
tion" of an accident, then a suit on that theory is with foundation
and is not purely conjectural.52 In Sidner, there was substantial
51 City of Oklahoma City v. Wilcoxson, 173 Okla. 433, 436, 48 P.2d 1039,
1043 (1935); accord, Kaminski v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 347 Mich. 417,
79 N.W.2d 899 (1956).
52 "[A] conjecture is simply an explanation consistent with known facts
or conditions, but not deducible from them as a reasonable inference.
There may be two or more plausible explanations as to how an event
happened or what produced it; yet, if the evidence is without selective
application to any one of them, they remain conjectures only. On the
other hand, [it is not mere conjecture] if there is evidence which points
to any one theory of causation, indicating a logical sequence of cause
and effect . . ." Sheptur v. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co., 261 F.2d
221, 224 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1003 (1959). (Emphasis
added.)
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basis for believing the accident was due to the negligence of
the decedent.53 A claim is not conjectural merely because it is
highly speculative. The extent to which the United States
Supreme Court is willing to go to protect speculative claims is
well illustrated by the Schroeder case, already discussed, where
the protected claim was one arising from a decrease in the value
of a river for "bathing, swimming, fishing and boating" because
of the decreased velocity of its flow. 54
Similarly, an unliquidated tort claim is not contingent, but is
generally held to become a vested interest when the injury occurs
or when the cause of action accrues.55
Furthermore, the only reason notice by mail was not re-
quired to be given to holders of contingent claims in Mullane was
because it would impose a "severe burden on the [common trust
fund] plan, and would likely dissipate its advantages."5 6 The
court said the general rule was that all interested parties were
entitled to notice by mail and that these exceptions on the
peculiar circumstances of Mullane57 were not to be construed as
altering that rule. The Court said, "Exceptions in the name of
necessity do not sweep away the rule that within the limits of
practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to
53 The decedent pulled out to pass another vehicle in the face of oncom-
ing traffic and skidded broadside into plaintiff's semitrailer. Plain-
tiff's driver could not avoid the accident. Brief for Appellant, p. 7,
Farmers Co-op. Mercantile Co. v. Sidner, 175 Neb. 94, 120 N.W.2d
537 (1963). The facts of the accident were undisputed by the appellee.
Brief for Appellee, p. 4.
54 See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
55 "A right of action, including one for personal injuries, is a vested
property interest, before as well as after judgment, at least 'Where it
comes into existence under common-law principles, and is not given
by statute as a mere penalty or without equitable basis.'" Massa v.
Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 147, 3 A.2d 839, 840 (1939). "'By the weight of
authority, a statutory right of action for damage to person or property,
which has accrued, is a vested right . . . .'" Minty v. State, 336 Mich.
370, 391, 58 N.W.2d 106, 112 (1953). "Moreover, when it became a
law, plaintiff's right of action for damages to person and property
under the former statute had accrued and was in her a vested right,
which the new statute did not take away." Cusick v. Feldpausch, 259
Mich. 349, 351-52, 243 N.W. 226 (1932). But see John E. Ballanger
Constr. Co. v. State Bd. of Adjustment, 234 Ala. 377, 175 So. 387 (1937);
Kelly v. Hall, 191 Ga. 470, 12 S.E.2d 881 (1941); Bailey v. School Dist.
No. 49, 108 Wash. 612, 185 Pac. 810 (1919).
56 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950).
57 The peculiar circumstances are discussed in the quotation in the text
accompanying note 62 infra.
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reach interested parties.""" What the limits of practicability
might be is further examined in the next section.
V. THE KIND OF NOTICE REQUIRED
From what has been said, the conclusion must follow that
where' the estate or its attorney has actual knowledge of poten-
tial claimants, or where their names are easily ascertainable, as
from the police accident report, those claimants must be given
notice by mail of the order barring claims.59 The United States
Supreme Court has said:
Notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach inter-
ested parties. Where the names and post office addresses of those
affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for
resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its
pendency.6 0
Neither Mullane nor any case following it has laid down any
general guide lines as to what would be required in the way of
discovering unknown claims. Perhaps the best indication is given
by section 25-520.01, which says the
affidavit of mailing of notice shall further be required to state
that such party and his attorney, after diligent investigation and
inquiry, were unable to ascertain and do not know the post-
office address of any other party appearing to have a direct legal
interest in such action or proceeding .... 61
It would, of course, be impractical to expect the deceased's execu-
tor or administrator to determine all possible tort claimants.
The United States Supreme Court has used language from which
it is logical to infer that an estate would not have to undertake
58 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950).
59 Perhaps the best illustration, from among the United States Supreme
Court cases, of the fact that a person must act in accordance with his
knowledge in the area of giving notice of judicial proceedings to inter-
ested parties, is found in the case of Covey v. Town of Somers, 351
U.S. 141 (1956). In that case, the plaintiff was notified by publication,
by mail, and by posting notices on her property that a lien for delin-
quent taxes was to be foreclosed against the property. The people
of the town knew, however, that she was mentally incompetent and
wholly unable to understand the nature of the proceedings against
her property. 'The Court held this would not afford notice to her and
that a taking under such circumstances would be without due process.
The Court said that, to satisfy the requirement that "'the means em-
ployed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it,'" the town should have first
appointed a guardian to look after her affairs. Id. at 146.
60 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318 (1950).
61 NEB. Ray. STAT. § 25-520.01 (Reissue 1964). (Emphasis added.)
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any "impractical and extended searches" or do anything which
would impose a "severe burden" on the probate proceedings. It
has also indicated that these matters are ones to be determined
largely by the states. The language referred to is from Mullane,
where the Court said:
Whatever searches might be required in another situation under
ordinary standards of diligence, in view of the character of the
proceedings and the nature of the interests here involved we think
them unnecessary .... [I]mpracticable and extended searches
are not required in the name of due process. The expense of
keeping informed from day to day of substitutions among even
current income beneficiaries and presumptive remaindermen, to
say nothing of the far greater number of contingent beneficiaries,
would impose a severe burden on the plan, and would likely dis-
sipate its advantages. These are practical matters in which we
should be reluctant to disturb the judgment of the state authori-
ties.62
Where the estate or its attorneys do not have actual knowl-
edge of a given claim or claimant and could not discover this in-
terest in the course of diligent investigation and inquiry, the
claimant's rights under the due process clause would not be vio-
lated, if he were given nothing more than notice by publication.6 3
The Court said in Mullane:
Thus it has been recognized that, in the case of persons missing
or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile
means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates
no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.64
62 339 U.S. at 317-18. (Emphasis added.)
63 It is interesting to speculate what the Nebraska Supreme Court would
do with a medical malpractice case where the injury was not discovered
until after a deceased doctor's estate had been probated. In Spath v.
Morrow, 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962), 42 NEB. L. REv. 180, the
court allowed a suit for medical malpractice to be brought nearly eight
years after the statute of limitations would normally have run, on
grounds that the statute did not begin to run until the injury was dis-
covered. Recovery was allowed against two doctors. Query: If one of
the doctors had died, and his estate had been probated, would recovery
have been limited to the other doctor? Would it have been denied en-
tirely if both had died? Iowa has held that an estate may be reopened
in a medical malpractice suit even though the claim is not filed within
the time allotted by the probate court. Groves v. Donohue, 254 Iowa
512, 118 N.W.2d 65 (1962). For the treatment in other states of the
statute of limitations problem, see authorities cited note 41 supra.
64 339 U.S. at 317. Accord, Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911); Cunnius
v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905); Miller v. Miller, 153
Neb. 890, 46 N.W.2d 618 (1951).
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VI. RECOVERY AGAINST INSURANCE
Irrespective of the requirements of due process, in Nebraska
an unliquidated tort claimant might be able to recover on his
claim up to the amount of the insurance coverage even after the
estate had been probated. In Cox v. Kresovicho the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that an automobile indemnity insurance
policy creates "an asset and estate of the deceased" 66 and that a
creditor for a risk covered in the policy may maintain a proceed-
ing for administration of the estate on the basis of the insurance
alone. Iowa has carried this one step further, holding that such
a suit may be maintained even where the claimant fails to file
within the time allowed by the nonclaim statute.67  Thus, in a
case such as Sidner, an insurance policy may be treated as an
undistributed asset of the estate. Section 30-620 of the Nebraska
Revised Statutes provides:
If the whole of the debts shall not have been paid by the first
distribution, and if the whole assets shall not have been distrib-
uted, or if other assets shall afterwards come to the hands of the
executor or administrator, the court may, from time to time, ac-
cording to the circumstances of the case, make further decree for
the distribution of assets.68
Reading this statute together with the Cox opinion, which
held an insurance policy to be an asset of the estate, it appears
that the holder of an unliquidated tort claim could petition to
have the court reappoint the executor or administrator and make
a decree for distribution of these assets.69 There is no public
policy behind denying an injured party an opportunity to recover
from an insurer of a deceased tortfeasor.
65 168 Neb. 673, 97 N.W.2d 239 (1959), 39 NEB. L. REv. 423 (1960), 12 STAN.
L. REV. 668 (1960). Accord, Furst v. Brady, 375 Ill. 425, 31 N.E.2d 606
(1940); Railsback v. Buesch, 253 Iowa 1064, 114 N.W.2d 916 (1962);
Liberty v. Kinney, 242 Iowa 656, 47 N.W.2d 835 (1951); Gordon v. Shea,
300 Mass. 95, 14 N.E.2d 105 (1938); Robinson v. Carroll, 87 N.H. 114,
174 Atl. 772 (1934); Kimbell v. Smith, 64 N.M. 374, 328 P.2d 942 (1958);
Miller v. Stiff, 62 N.M. 383, 310 P.2d 1039 (1957); In re Estate of Vilas,
166 Ore. 115, 110 P.2d 940 (1941). Contra, In re Estate of Rogers, 164
Kan. 492, 190 P.2d 857 (1948); In re Roche, 16 N.J. 579, 109 A.2d 655
(1954).
66 168 Neb. at 680, 97 N.W.2d at 244.
67 Railsback v. Buesch, 253 Iowa 1064, 114 N.W.2d 916 (1962).
68 NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-620 (Reissue 1964).
69 "[W]here . .. personal property is subsequently found belonging to
the estate, the proper practice is for the county court to reappoint the
executor unless he is incompetent to act." Barker v. Wardens & Ves-
trymen of St. Barnabas Church, 176 Neb. 327, 333, 126 N.W.2d 170, 175
(1964).
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The nature of insurance was discussed by the Illinois Supreme
Court in People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher,70 where the court pointed
out that automobile indemnity insurance exists solely for the
benefit of the general public. The court said "a liability insur-
ance policy exists for the single purpose of satisfying the liability
that it covers. It has no other function and no other value.
71
In Nebraska, Chief Justice White has said that an insurance
contract "is designed to protect . . .injured persons on the public
highways and to . . . [such a] contract the [injured] plaintiff is a
third party beneficiary. ' 72
By making insurance or other showing of financial respon-
sibility compulsory, the Nebraska Legislature has tried to insure
that members of the public are protected against the risk of being
unable to recover damages for injuries caused by the negligent
operation of motor vehicles by impecunious individuals. Financial
responsibility laws act, in the words of Chief Justice White, "in
the interests of protecting travelers on a public highway."73  To
deprive an injured party of compensation through insurance in
order to satisfy a technical rule which exists solely for the
beneficiaries of an estate would nullify the benevolent purpose of
such laws and would permit insurance companies to avoid their
statutory obligations.
CONCLUSION
From this discussion, it should be clear that the question
of when notice by mail of a proceeding is required to be given a
party whose property rights may be affected is one intimately
bound up not only with section 25-520.01, but also with the
federal due process clause. In order that Nebraska's notice by
publication statutes may meet federal constitutional requirements
and comply with the original legislative intent underlying section
25-520.01, this statute must be construed in light of the United
States Supreme Court opinions concerning sufficiency of notice.
That Court has said that due process requires whatever notice is
reasonable to be given a party whose property interests may be
adversely affected by a proceeding, and this means at least notice
by mail where that party's name and address are known. The
law is still unclear as to what is required when a party's interest
70 12 ml1. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957).
7' Id. at 238, 145 N.E.2d at 593.
72 Mecke v. Bahr, 177 Neb. 584, 595-96, 129 N.W.2d 573, 579 (1964) (dis-
senting opinion).
73 Id. at 596, 129 N.W.2d at 580.
COMMENT
is unknown, but could be discovered through investigation. From
its pronouncements on the subject, it may be inferred that the
Court would not require- unreasonable investigation, but would
require some. The Court has said that the question of what is
reasonable under the circumstances is best left to state authorities.
But it would certainly require notification of people listed in the
police report as having been injured or as having suffered prop-
erty damage. Similarly, it would require the notification of the
spouse, parents, or children of other people killed in the accident.
Whatever the precise requirements of due process may be,
they apply to an unliquidated tort claim, since such a claim is a
property interest and may no more be taken without due
process than any other form of property.
In Sidner, the Nebraska Supreme Court rightly displays re-
luctance to reopen a probate proceeding once an estate has been
settled, since there is strong public policy against disturbing
settled property rights. But if the court continues with its
present line of reasoning, it is likely to clash headlong with the
federal due process clause.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that automobile in-
surance is an asset of the deceased sufficient to support adminis-
tration of his estate.7 4 The Iowa Supreme Court has held that
insurance may support administration of an estate even though
the time for filing claims has already expired7 5 By the same
reasoning, insurance should be treated as an asset sufficient to
justify reopening probate proceedings and to support decrees for
further distribution of assets. Financial responsibility laws ex-
ist for the protection of the public. To deny an injured party the
opportunity to recover from the insurer of a deceased person de-
feats the intent of these laws and serves no practical purpose.
Gregory D. Erwin '65
74 Cox v. Kresovich, 168 Neb. 673, 97 N.W.2d 239 (1959).
75 Railsback v. Buesch, 253 Iowa 1064, 114 N.W.2d 916 (1962). See also
Groves v. Donohue, 254 Iowa 512, 118 N.W.2d 65 (1962).
